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For Reconciliation
Andrew W. McThenia
Thomas L. Shaffer t
Professor Owen Fiss, in his recent comment, Against Settlement,"
weighs in against the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement.
He brings to the discussion his often stated preference for adjudication,
which he views as "a tribute to our inventiveness," 2 to be encouraged because it is a forum for the articulation of important public values. Fiss
argues that the entire movement for alternatives to litigation is misplaced.
He understands that the movement's claim to legitimacy turns on the inefficiency of the legal system and on popular dissatisfaction with law as a
means for maintaining order, and he challenges this claim.
Fiss attacks a straw man. In our view, the models he has created for
argument in other circumstances4 have become mechanisms of selfdeception not only for him but for most of those who write about alternatives to litigation. His understanding that the plea of ADR advocates is
based on efficiency reduces the entire question to one of procedures. Fiss's
argument rests on the faith that justice-and he uses the word-is usually
something people get from the government. He comes close to arguing
that the branch of government that resolves disputes, the courts, is the
principal source of justice in fragmented modern American society."
Fiss's view that the claims of ADR advocates arise from a popular dist Professors of Law, Washington and Lee University.
The inspiration and much of the scholarship for this comment came from students in a seminar on
value-based systems of mediation which the authors directed in spring 1984 at the School of Law,
Washington and Lee University. We are particularly indebted to James Canup, a 1984 graduate of
the school, for his research on Jewish reconciliation courts; to guests of the seminar, who included
Lynn R. Buzzard, Ronald Kraybill, and Lawrence Hoover; to Prof. Stephan Kutner of the University
of California (Berkeley), who was helpful in directing our research on canon law sources; and to our
colleagues, Professors Roger Groot, Lewis LaRue and Brian Murchison.
1. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YAIE L.J. 1073 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Against Settlement].
2. Id. at 1090.
3. Professor Fiss equates settlement with ADR and says that settlement should be treated as a
"highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets." Id. at 1075. His citations to the underlying
story of ADR are to the law and economics literature. Id. at 1076 n.11. He attributes to President
Bok the view that litigation "is evidence of the needlessly combative and quarrelsome character of
Americans." Id. at 1089.
4. See 0. Fss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Forms of
Justice]; Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundationsof Adjudication, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Foundationsof Adjudication].
5. In describing those cases unsuitable for ADR Fiss includes "those in which justice needs to be
done, or to put it more modestly, where there is a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law." Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 1, at 1087.
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satisfaction with law reduces the issue to one of order.' As his first stated
understanding reduces justice to statism, this understanding reduces justice
(or, if you like, peace) to a tolerably minimum level of violence in the
community. In our view, an appropriate engagement of the Fiss attack on
ADR must go all the way back to these two characterizations in his argument against ADR and in favor of court-dominated dispute resolution.
We are not willing to let him frame the issue.
Certain themes recur in the ADR literature. Many advocates of ADR
make efficiency-based claims. And a plea for ending the so-called litigation explosion, and for returning to law and order, runs through the
rules-of-procedure branch of the ADR literature.7 But the movement, if it
is even appropriate to call it a single movement, is too varied for Fiss's
description. Rather than focusing on the substance of claims made for
ADR, Fiss has created a view of the function of courts that he can comfortably oppose.
In an earlier and provocative article, Fiss called for both a recognition
and an affirmation of the expanded role of courts in modem America.'
He urged an explicit recognition that "[a]djudication is the social process
by which judges give meaning to our public values." 9 Further, he argued
that a new form of adjudication, "structural reform," be celebrated as "a
central-maybe the central-mode of constitutional adjudication."' 0 To
develop his thesis and to meet Professor Lon Fuller's arguments on the
limits of adjudication," Fiss resorted to modelling. He contrasted his preferred view of adjudication, "structural reform," with what he described
as a "traditional" model of adjudication. Although it is not clear whether
he understood the substance of the two types of adjudication to be fundamentally different, 12 he clearly viewed the form of structural reform litiga6. Id. at 1075:
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence
of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.
7. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE Wrror LAW? (1983); 1 THE PoIrTcs OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN ExP imtscE (R. Abel ed. 1982); 2 THE POLTICs OF INFORMAL JusTICE:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES (R. Abel ed. 1982); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274
(1982); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). For a statement raising questions about the existence of a legal explosion, see
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 7 (1983).
8. Fiss, Forms ofJustice, supra note 4.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
11. Professor Fuller's essay, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, was published posthumously
at 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978). Typed versions of it were circulated some years prior to that time.
See also Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 PRoG. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 1 (1960); Fuller,
Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3.
12. See Fiss, Forms ofJustice, supra note 4. At one point Fiss asserts that the function of adjudi-
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tion as "breathtakingly different" 1 from the "dispute resolution" or
"traditional" model of adjudication.
While Fiss was initially content to construct contrasting models of adjudication simply in order to accentuate his position and argue against
Fuller's, he has in more recent writings asserted that one of these models,
that of traditional dispute resolution, has a life of its own, a life that has
"long dominated the literature and our thinking."14 In fact, Fiss's later,
positive description of structural reform continues to flower, while his
negative description of traditional adjudication has become abstract and
lifeless. Fiss's response to the imperfections of life that lay bare the difficulties with his model of structural reform has been, it seems to us, to
provide a shrill description of traditional judicial dispute resolution.'
Fiss's description of traditional dispute resolution is a story of two
neighbors "in a state of nature" who each claim a single piece of property
and who, when they cannot agree, turn to "a stranger" to resolve their
dispute. 8 He asserts that traditional dispute resolution depicts a sociologically impoverished universe,' 7 operates in a state of nature where there
are no public values or goals' 8 except a supposed "natural harmony" of
the status quo, 19 and calls on the exercise of power by a stranger.2" That
was never Fuller's position. Nor do we find much support in the literature or in reality for such a view of traditional adjudication. If there ever
cation throughout the 19th and 20th centuries was not to resolve disputes, id. at 36, but at other
places he acknowledges that the historical work of courts may have been akin to dispute resolution.
Id. at 35-36. In his later writings, perhaps in response to criticism that he had failed "to place
institutional litigation in perspective as part of a more complex legal and political tradition," Eisen-

berg & Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinayin InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REv.
465, 516 (1980), Fiss asserts that it has always been the role of adjudication to give meaning to our
public values "continuous with the role of courts under the common law." But he claims that "a new
form of constitutional adjudication has emerged." Fiss, Foundationsof Adjudication, supra note 4, at
121.
13. Fiss, Forms ofJustice, supra note 4, at 17.
14. Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 4, at 122.
15. Professor Fiss has more recently come to hear the criticism of his model for structural reform:
"One obvious threat to the integrity of the judicial prccess, which has been minimized in my earlier
work but which is becoming of increasing concern to me, is the bureaucratization of the judiciary."
Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 4, at 126. Many of his arguments in favor of structural reform were initially challenged by Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell. See Eisenberg & Yeazell,
supra note 12. See also Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?, 6 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 129
(1982); Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 H~Aiv. L. Rav. 374 (1982). In Foundationsof Adjudication, Fiss discusses the internal strains on his model of structural reform: "These dynamics place
strains upon the idea of structural reform, and yet, I would insist, they do not render that model of
adjudication either incoherent or beyond the reach of the judicial power." Fiss, Foundationsof Adjudication, supra note 4, at 127.

16. Fiss, Foundationsof Adjudication, supra note 4, at 127; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note
1, at 1075.
17. Fiss, Foundationsof Adjudication, supra note 4, at 122-23.
18. Id. at 123.
19. Id. at 124.
20. Id.
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was such a world we expect it was "nasty, brutish and short." However,
we don't really believe that traditional adjudication ever bore much resemblance to that story. Yet this is the view of the world that Fiss attributes
to the advocates of ADR; his attack on ADR is premised on that notion. 1
Models are, of course, human creations. The good ones contain elements of the creator's perception of the world and of the reality he seeks
to perceive.22 They are designed to invite conversation and to appeal to the
reader in a search for understanding. They are abstractions; but to be
effective, they must have some connection either with the creator's view of
reality or with what he wants the world to be like. Fiss's model of structural reform is, in this way, an effective model."3 While it may not depict
the world that many of us observe, it does reflect his view of the world he
wishes he could find. It reflects, we suspect, more his hope than his actual
belief. We honor that. The model is rich. It leads to conversation and
debate.
But Fiss's model of traditional dispute resolution is flat; it is only an
abstraction, and is therefore also a caricature. It has no relation to the
world as it is; it does not appeal to the reader as a convincing way to
understand adjudication or its alternatives. It does not permit one to express hope in alternatives to adjudication.
In any event, after setting up his "state of nature" model of dispute
resolution, Fiss attributes that view of the world to the advocates of ADR.
He understands pleas to consider alternatives to current means of resolving disputes as turning on the inefficiency of traditional adjudication (his
negative model), and popular dissatisfaction with it. He equates the ADR
movement with those who urge settlement more than judgment and who
seek a "truce more than a true reconciliation." 2 He argues that settlement is "a capitulation to the conditions of mass society," a capitulation
that "should be neither encouraged nor praised."2 5 He assumes that the
ADR movement is one that wants peace at any price and treats settlement
21. "They [advocates of ADR] act as though courts arose to resolve quarrels between neighbors
who had reached an impasse and turned to a stranger for help." Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note
1, at 1075,
22. See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276, 1282
(1984).
23. While one might disagree with Professor Fiss's description of structural reform, one must
acknowledge the eloquence of his language. Criticism of his scholarship rests more on logic than
formulation. One of the major criticisms of his 1979 work, Forms ofJustice, supra note 4, was that by
setting up his either/or worlds, Fiss had exaggerated the discontinuity between past and present, see
supra note 12. In effect, he had cut the model of structural reform free from history. To suggest that
something radically different was under way in adjudication made structural reform suspect and vulnerable to attack. Eisenberg and Yeazell also criticized Fiss for exaggerating the differences in form
between traditional litigation practices and remedies, and the model of structural reform. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 516.
24. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 1, at 1075.
25. Id.
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as "the anticipation of the outcome of trial, ' 26 that is, trial in his strangerjudge, negative model of adjudication.
Fiss is against settlement because he views the matters that come before
courts in America, and that are inappropriate for ADR, as including cases
in which: (1) there are distributional inequities; (2) securing authoritative
consent or settlement is difficult; (3) continued supervision following judgment is necessary; and (4) there is a genuine need for an authoritative
interpretation of law.27 Fiss characterizes disputes in this limited way-as
arguments between two neighbors, one of whom has vastly superior bargaining power over the other. It is then easy for him to prefer litigation to
settlement, because litigation is a way to equalize bargaining power.
The soundest and deepest part of the ADR movement does not rest on
Fiss's two-neighbors model. It rests on values-of religion, community,
and work place-that are more vigorous than Fiss thinks. In many, in fact
most, of the cultural traditions that argue for ADR, settlement is neither
an avoidance mechanism nor a truce. Settlement is a process of reconciliation in which the anger of broken relationships is to be confronted rather
than avoided, and in which healing demands not a truce but confrontation. Instead of "trivializing the remedial process," ' settlement exalts that
process. Instead of "reducing the social function . . .to one of resolving

private disputes," 9 settlement calls on substantive community values. Settlement is sometimes a beginning, and is sometimes a postscript, but it is
not the essence of the enterprise of dispute resolution. The essence of the
enterprise is more like the structural injunction, about which Fiss has
written so eloquently, than like an alternative to the resolution-bystranger described by his negative model."0
The "real divide""1 between us and Fiss may not be our differing views
of the sorts of cases that now wind their way into American courts, but,
more fundamentally, it may be our different views of justice. Fiss comes
close to equating justice with law. He includes among the cases unsuited
for settlement "those in which justice needs to be done, or to put it more
modestly, where there is a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law.""2 We do not believe that law and justice are synonymous. We see the deepest and soundest of ADR arguments as in agreement with us: Justice is not usually something people get from the
26. Id. at 1076.
27. Id. at 1087.
28. "The dispute-resolution story trivializes the remedial dimensions of lawsuits and mistakenly
assumes judgment to be the end of the process." Id. at 1082.
29. Id."at 1085.
30. See Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
31. This is Professor Fiss's phrase. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 1, at 1087.
32. Id.
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government. And courts (which are not, in any case, strangers) are not the
only or even the most important places that dispense justice. 8
Many advocates of ADR can well be taken to have asked about the
law's response to disputes, and alternatives to that response, not in order
to reform the law but in order to locate alternative views of what a dispute is. Such alternatives would likely advance or assume understandings
of justice (or, if you like, peace) that are also radically different from justice as something lawyers administer, or peace as the absence of violence.
They assume not that justice is something people get from the government
but that it is something people give to one another. These advocates seek
an understanding of justice in the way Socrates and Thrasymachus did in
the Republic: Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not efficiency in
government; it is not the reduction of violence: Justice is what we discover-you and I, Socrates said-when we walk together, listen together,
and even love one another, in our curiosity about what justice is and
where justice comes from.
Most of us who have gone to college know something about Socrates.
Many more of us who grew up in the United States know something
about Moses and Jesus. It is from Torah and Gospel, more than from
Plato, that we are most likely to be able to sketch out radical alternatives
to the law's response to disputes. As a matter of fact, our religious culture
contains both a theoretical basis for these alternatives and a way to apply
theory to disputes.
In the Hebraic tradition (as in the Islamic), scripture is normative. Judaism, for example, does not merely seek to follow Torah; it loves Torah,
it finds life in Torah, it celebrates Torah as one might celebrate the presence of a lover, or of a loving parent, or of a community that nourishes
peace-commitment to common well being, and even a feeling of being
well. (Salvation is not too strong a word for it.) Justice is the way one
defines a righteous life; justice does involve according other persons their
due but, more radically, in the Hebraic view, it involves loving them. Such
33. See T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 135-36 (1981); Shaffer, The
Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms, 17 VAL U.L. Rxv. 1 (1983).
Professor Milner S. Ball, who discussed this comment with us, suggested that Fiss is not arguing so
much against religious or community-based ADR as against DR (deregulation). Fiss may, Ball suggests, be asking us to consider whether an overly enthusiastic support of settlement is not another form
of the deregulation movement, one that permits private actors with powerful economic interests to
pursue self-interest free of community norms. We may, Ball suggests, be reacting to Fiss's overly
inclusive statements about ADR; he may have over-stated, and we may have over-reacted. Thus, we
may have more common ground than we think. Ball's suggestion is one we will enjoy pursuing. When
we do, we will want to tell Ball that the powerful economic interests are as much members of the
fragmented but also reconciling community as the oppressed are. And we will want to tell Fiss that it
may make a general and important difference that, in almost any kind of ADR, (a) the parties talk to
one another, rather than to the government; and that (b) the third party, if there is one present, comes
not as a resolver of disputes but as a neighbor.
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a justice is the product of piety, to be sure, but not piety alone; it is the
product of study, of reason, and of attending to the wise and learning from
35
them how to be virtuous. 4 Quarefidem intellectum.
The Christian side of the Hebraic tradition has, or should have, all of
this. It also has a unique procedure established in St. Matthew's Gospel-a system backed up by stern condemnation of Christians who turn
from the Gospel and seek instead the law's response to disputes. In this
system-as well as in Judaism" 6-the religious community claims authority to resolve disputes and even to coerce obedience. The procedure involves, first, conversation; if that fails, it involves mediation; if mediation
fails, it involves airing the dispute before representatives of the community. If the dispute goes so far as judgment, the system-as is also the case
in Judaism-permits pressure: "[I]f he refuses to listen to the community,
treat him like a pagan or a tax collector. I tell you solemnly, whatever you
bind on earth shall be considered bound in heaven; whatever you loose on
' 37
earth shall be considered loosed in heaven."
Thus, the procedure gives priority to restoring the relationship. Hebraic
theology puts primary emphasis on relationships, a priority that is political and even ontological, as well as ethical, and therefore legal. 8 And so,
most radically, the religious tradition seeks not resolution (which connotes
the sort of doctrinal integrity in the law that seems to us to be Fiss's
highest priority) but reconciliation of brother to brother, sister to sister,
sister to brother, child to parent, neighbor to neighbor, buyer to seller,
defendant to plaintiff, and judge to both. (The Judge is also an I and a
Thou.) This view of what a dispute is, and of what third parties seek
when they intervene in disputes between others, provides an existing,
traditional, common alternative to the law's response. The fact seems to be
that this alternative has both a vigorous modern history and a studiable
contemporary vitality (Jerrold Auerbach"9 to the contrary notwithstanding).
34. See Passamaneck & Brown, The Rabbis-Preventive Law Lawyers, 8 ISRAEL L. REv. 538
(1973). We use "Hebraic" here, as Will Herberg does, to mean the ethical tradition common to
Christians and Jews. See W. HERBERG, JUDIAISM AND MODERN MAN: AN INTERPRETATION OF
JEWISH RELIGION 139 (1980).
35. "Faith seeking understanding."
36. See, e.g., AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA: COLLaCTED RESPONSA OF THE CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS, 1889-1983 (W. Jacob ed. 1983); I. GOLDSTEIN, JEWISH JUSTICE
AND CONCILIATION: HISTORY OF THE JEWISH CONCILIATION BOARD OF AMERICA, 1930-1968 AND
A REVIEW OF JEWISH JUDICIAL AUTONOMY (1981); I. SINGER, IN My FATHER'S COURT (1966); J.
YAFFE, So SUE ME! THE STORY OF A COMMUNITY COURT (1972); Baron, The Treatment ofiewish
Law in American Decisions, 9 ISRAEL L. REV. 85 (1974); Meislin,Jewish Law in American Tribunals, 7 ISRAEL L. REV. 349 (1972).
37. Matthew 18: 17-18.
38. See M. BUBER, I AND THOU (W. Kaufmann trans. 1970); M. BUBER, ON JUDAISM (N.
Glatzer ed. 1967).
39. J. AUERBACH, supra note 7.

1666

For Reconciliation
Contemporary manifestations of the Hebraic tradition claim adherence
to a moral authority that is more important than the government.4 ° The
Torah is the wisdom of God; the Gospel is the good news that promises a
peace the world cannot give. From one perspective, theology makes such
religious views of dispute and resolution seem peripheral. That impression
is deceptive, though: In the aggregate these views of what a dispute is are
consistent with one another and, as such, consistent with the moral commitments of most people in America. The numbers of people in this country who might find them so is not declining; it is increasing. "In the aggregate" is an appropriate consideration, as one assays radical alternatives
to the law's response to disputes, because there is substantial commonality
among the practitioners of this radical, Hebraic alternative. Religious systems of reconciliation rest on a substantively common theology and on a
substantively common argument that, contrary to the implications of Fiss's
view of justice, the government is not as important as it thinks it is.
Professor David Trubek ends a recent and pessimistic essay on alternative dispute resolution 41 with a paradox: "[N]o one," he says, "really
seems to believe in law any more."' 2 The "elites" who complain of a
litigation explosion-Chief Justice Warren Burger and others "who
champion alternatives"' 8 -"question the law's efficacy." 44 But so do those
who criticize the law as political and oppressive, most notably scholars in
the Critical Legal Studies movement. The elites exalt an informalism they
don't believe in, Trubek says; and the radicals exalt a formalism they
distrust. Apparently the new legal-process school-or at least one of its
eloquent spokesmen, Owen Fiss-still believes in law. Fiss's writing on
structural reform is powerful. It may not reflect the way the world actually is, but it is a statement of hope. And that is important in an age of
nihilism. But we suspect those who believe in law and in nothing else; we
hope Fiss is not among them. Informalism of the Chief Justice's formulation4 5 may deserve distrust. But informalism has some contemporary man40. See supra note 36. For sources on systems of reconciliation, see: (1) Jewish: A. GOREN, NEw
YORK JEWS AND THE QUEST FOR CoMMuNITy: THE KEHILLAH ExPERmENT,1908-22

(1970); (2)

Canon law: Coing, English Equity and the DenunciatioEvangelica of the Canon Law, 71 LAW Q.
REv. 223 (1955). Our seminar, see supra note t,also considered German and French treatises on
what is usually called arbitration in common law, the former in preliminary translations done for us
by Mrs. Maria Colvin; (3) Peace church (Anabaptist): L. BUZARD & R. KRAYmI, MFDIATION: A
READER (1980); R. KRAYBILL,REPAIRING THE BREAc: MINISTERING IN COMMUNrrY CONFLIr
(1980); (4) Evangelical Christian: L. BUZZARD & L. EcK, TELL IT TO THE CHURCH (1982); C.
CAssrry, RESOLUTION OF DIssurEs BErwEEN CHRInIANs (rev. ed. 1981). The Buzzard and Eck
book contains a useful bibliography.
41. Trubek, Turning Away From Law?, 82 MxcH. L. REv. 824 (1984).
42. Id. at 835.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Burger, supra note 7.
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ifestations-many of them resting on the most ancient and deepest of our
traditions-that deserve trust and even celebration. These manifestations
too are statements of hope. Suggestions for alternatives to litigation need
to be critically examined-no doubt many of them are hollow. What they
do not need, and what the legal community does not need, is an argument
that reduces these alternatives to a caricature.
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